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We estimate a flexible non-linear monetary policy rule for the UK to examine 
the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate.  We have three main 
findings. First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate misalignment 
rather than to the real exchange rate itself.  Second, policymakers ignore 
small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real exchange 
under-valuations of more than 4% and over-valuations of more than 5%.   
Third, the response of policymakers to inflation is smaller when the exchange 
rate is over-valued and larger when it is under-valued.  None of these 
responses is allowed for in the widely-used Taylor rule, suggesting that 
monetary policy is better analysed using a more sophisticated model, such as 
the one suggested in this paper. 
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The importance of the exchange rate to monetary policy is reflected in 
large academic and policy-related literatures on the topic.  We contribute to 
this literature by addressing three issues.  First, although empirical models of 
open-economy monetary policy rules assume that interest rates respond to 
the exchange rate, policymakers and economic commentators often focus on 
exchange rate misalignment rather than the exchange rate itself.  We 
therefore investigate whether interest rates respond to exchange rate 
misalignments rather than to the exchange rate itself.  Second, existing 
models assume that policymakers respond to all movements in the real 
exchange rate.  This may not be the case.  As a consequence of a desire to 
avoid frequent small adjustments of the interest rate and difficulties in 
measuring exchange rate misalignment with precision, policymakers may only 
respond to larger real exchange rate misalignments.  We investigate the 
evidence for this.  Third, since the exchange rate influences inflation, we 
might expect the response of policymakers to inflation to depend on the 
exchange rate.  For example, we might expect a less vigorous response to 
inflation when the exchange rate is over-valued and thus exerting downward 
pressure on inflation. We assess evidence for this.   3
  We proceed as follows.  Considering the issue of whether policymakers 
respond to exchange rates or to misalignments, the academic literature has 
tested the significance of the real exchange rate in monetary policy rules by 
estimating augmented Taylor rules which relate interest rates to inflation, the 
output gap and the exchange rate.  However contributions by policymakers 
suggest another approach.  For example, Nickell (2005), in discussing the 
appreciation of sterling that began in 1996 comments that “the dramatic rise in 
1996/7.. led people to refer to unsustainability, misalignment and even 
bubbles…  However as time passed and sterling [did not depreciate], talk of 
unsustainability and misalignment died away”. This suggests that 
policymakers may have responded to real exchange rate misalignments 
rather than the real exchange rate itself.  This implies that existing models 
may be mispecified.  We test whether policymakers respond to the real 
exchange rate itself or to exchange rate misalignments by comparing 
estimates of an augmented Taylor rule that includes the exchange rate 
against one that includes exchange rate misalignment.  
  We then consider whether the response of monetary policy to the real 
exchange rate is more sophisticated than allowed for in the simple monetary 
policy rules that have been used thus far in the literature.  These monetary 
policy rules assume a constant proportional response to the exchange rate.  
However this may be too simplistic.  As quoted in Adam et al (2005), the 
minutes of the March 1999 meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
state “it would not be sensible for policy to react to high frequency movements   4
in the exchange rate as this could lead to a more volatile path for interest 
rates..[which might].. make it more difficult for others to understand the 
motives for interest rate changes”.  Taken together with the difficulty in 
accurately measuring exchange rate misalignment, this suggests that 
policymakers may respond more vigorously to larger exchange rate 
misalignments.  Indeed the MPC minutes suggest that policymakers may only 
respond to large exchange rate misalignments.  
  We also consider whether the real exchange rate affects the response 
of policymakers to the inflation rate. Exchange rate misalignments affect the 
inflation rate; a large over-valuation, for example, places downward pressure 
on inflation.  One might then expect the response of policymakers to inflation 
to depend on the exchange rate, so that the response of policymakers to the 
inflation rate might be smaller when the exchange rate is substantially over-
valued. 
These latter two issues cannot be addressed using a conventional 
linear monetary policy rule, as this assumes a constant proportional response 
to inflation and the exchange rate and assumes that the marginal response to 
one variable is independent of the values of other variables.   These issues 
require a model in which the response to the exchange rate can differ 
depending on whether this is under-valued, over-valued or close to 
fundamentals.  It also requires a model in which the response to inflation 
depends on the real exchange rate.  We therefore use a model which allows 
for these effects.    5
We address these issues using data for the UK since 1992, so our 
sample comprises the period of inflation targeting.  We have a number of 
interesting findings.  First, we find that Taylor rule models that include 
measures of real exchange rate misalignments outperform models that 
include the exchange rate.  This suggests that the latter type of model is 
mispecified and that policymakers respond to real exchange rate 
misalignment rather than the real exchange rate itself. Second, we find that 
policymakers only respond to larger misalignments of the real exchange rate.  
Our estimates suggest that there is no response to the real exchange rate if 
exchange rates are under-valued by less than 4.4% or over-valued by less 
than 5.1%.  As we discuss, these estimates imply that policymakers raised 
interest rates in response to under-valuations of the exchange rate in 1992-
1993, 1995-1996 and reduced interest rates in response to an over-valuation 
in 1996-1998, but did not respond to the exchange rate at other times.  Third, 
we find that the response of policymakers to inflation does depend on the 
exchange rate.  The response is strongest when the exchange rate is 
significantly under-valued and weakest when it is over-valued.  This implies 
that the increase in interest rates in response to excessive inflation is stronger 
in periods when exchange rate under-valuation intensifies inflationary 
pressures.   To illustrate, although inflation was excessively high in 1995-1996 
and in 1997-1998, the response to inflation was stronger in the first period 
when the exchange was under-valued and weaker in the latter when the 
exchange rate was over-valued.   6
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2) 
addresses the issue of whether policymakers respond to exchange rates or to 
misalignment, explaining our methodology and presenting estimates that 
suggest that the response is to misalignments.  Section 3) addresses the 
remaining issues, explaining the multiple-regime model and presenting 
estimates.  Section 4) summarises and concludes.    
 
2) Monetary policy and real exchange rate misalignment 
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where δ is the discount rate and L is the per-period loss function, given by  
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The loss function depends on the divergence of the inflation rate (π) from the 
inflation target (
T π ), the output gap (y), on the divergence of the nominal interest 
rate (i) from its’ equilibrium value (i*) and on potentially destabilising capital flows 
(F). 
The aggregate demand curve is    7
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where  y  captures other determinants of aggregate demand and ε
d
t is an i.i.d 
demand shock. This is a standard forward-looking demand relationship.   
Aggregate supply is the familiar New-Keynesian Philips curve   
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t ε is an i.i.d supply shock.   Capital flows depend on the differential 
between domestic and foreign interest rates and on the deviation of the real 
exchange rate (defined as the real price of domestic currency in terms of   
foreign currency) from its’ fundamental value: 
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where 
f i  is the foreign interest rate, eis the real exchange rate and  * e  is the 
fundamental value of the real exchange rate. 
  Assuming that policymakers choose the nominal interest rate at the 
start of period t using information available up to the end of period (1 ) t − , the 
first-order condition is  
    8
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Using (3)-(5) this can be written as 
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φ =  ( 1 0 γ >  since  0 φ < ).  Solving this, we can 
express the optimal monetary policy rule as  
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.    Equation (8) is an open-economy Taylor rule.  It differs from 
models estimated in the literature in that interest rates respond to real 
exchange rate misalignment rather than to the real exchange rate itself.  In 
the remainder of this section we present empirical evidence on the superiority 
of the policy rule in (8) and argue that the existing model is mispecified.   9
Allowing for interest rate smoothing (which possibly arises for the 
reasons discussed in Woodford, 2003) by assuming that the actual nominal 
interest rate adjusts towards the desired rate by 
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and invoking rational expectations, the policy rule can be expressed as  
 
(10)  11 1 (1 ){ ( ) ( * )}
Tf
ti t i t y t f te t t t ii i y i e e π ρ ρρ π π ρ ρρ ε −+ + =+ −+− + + +−+   
 
where  ε  is an error term that contains the errors generated by replacing 
expected values of variables with actual values. 
Estimates of this model are presented in column (i) of Table 1.  We use 
UK data for the period 1992Q4-2005Q4.  We measure i using the 3-month 
Treasury Bill Rate, π as the year-on-year proportional change in the retail 
price index, y as the proportional deviation of output from its underlying 
(Hodrick-Prescott, 1997) trend, i
f is the US 3-month effective funds rate and e 
is the log of the real effective exchange rate.  These definitions are similar to 
the existing literature, although Adam et al (2005) use both US and German 
interest rates (we also present estimates that use this rate), while Chadha et 
al (2004) measure the output gap using the share of labour in national income  
(Gali et al, 2001).  Since 1997Q2 (when the Bank of England was given   10
operational independence), the inflation target, 
T π , is equal to 2.5 percent.  
Prior to that date, we construct the target as the centred two-year moving 
average of actual inflation (see also the discussion in Kesriyeli et al, 2006).  
Figure 1 plots the UK interest rate, UK inflation rate, UK output gap, the US 
interest rate and the German (Euro after 1999) interest rate. 
We calculate the equilibrium real exchange rate as the Hodrick-
Prescott filtered value (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) of the real exchange rate 
and calculate exchange rate misalignment as the difference between the real 
exchange rate and its trend value.  The resultant series is plotted in Figure 2, 
alongside the exchange rate.  The narrative in Cobham (2006) provides a 
detailed description of movements in the exchange rate over this period and 
the concerns of policymakers about this, while Batini and Nelson (2005) 
provide a broader historical perspective.  The exchange rate was under-
valued between 1993-1996, over-valued from 1996-2000 and close to 
equilibrium thereafter.  The effects of the appreciation that began in 1996 are 
initially marked but fall away quite rapidly.  This is consistent with the 
comments of Nickell (2005) cited above.  Although a more satisfactory 
measure of real exchange rate misalignment might be derived from a more 
structural model, we would argue that the measure depicted in Figure 2 is 
plausible and will serve as a satisfactory first approximation.   
We estimate  π ρ =1.76 and  y ρ =0.91 (these are similar to other studies, 
eg Martin and Milas, 2003, and Mihailov, 2005),  f ρ =0.38 (this is also similar   11
to previous studies, see Adam et al, 2005, Table 1) and  e ρ =0.10 (Chadha et 
al, 2004 report an estimate of 0.06 from a model using the exchange rate 
rather than misalignment).   We test for a structural break (in 1997Q2 
following the transfer of responsibility for interest rate decisions to the newly-
formed monetary policy committee) but find none.  Column (ii) presents 
estimates that use the German (Euro) rather than the US interest rate.  The 
estimates are similar, although the model fits the data less well 
As mentioned above, the existing literature on empirical open economy 
monetary policy rules typically uses a different model of the optimal policy 
rule, which can be summarised as 
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Adam et al (2005) use a specification similar to (11) but without the real 
exchange rate, while Chadha et al (2004) do not include the foreign interest 
rate.  Equation (11) differs from the optimal rule in (10) in that interest rates 
respond to the exchange rate rather than to exchange rate misalignment.  
  Column (iii) of Table 1) presents estimates of (11) using the US interest 
rate to measure 
f
t i .    Although the estimates are broadly similar to those of 
(10) (although the coefficient on the exchange rate is now insignificant); it is 
clear that the fit of the model is worse.  The model also fails the test of 
structural stability.  Column (iv) reports estimates that use the German (Euro)   12
interest rate; the fit of the model is worse than the corresponding estimates of 
(10) in column (ii).  In summary, our estimates show that an open economy 
Taylor rule that includes real exchange rate misalignment is superior to one 
that includes the exchange rate.  This suggests that the existing model is 
mispecified.  
 
3)  A more complex model 
In this section we turn to the issues of whether policymakers only 
respond to larger exchange misalignments and whether the response to 
inflation depends on the exchange rate.  Neither issue can be addressed 
using an augmented Taylor rule like (10).  In that, interest rates respond to all 
exchange misalignments irrespective of their size, while the marginal 
response of interest rates to inflation is not affected by the exchange rate.  
We therefore generalise (10) by using the time-varying parameter 
model 
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If the behaviour of policymakers depends on whether the exchange rate is 
significantly over-valued or under-valued, the economy will have three distinct 
exchange rate “regimes”.   The economy is in the over-valued regime if the 
degree of over-valuation exceeds a value of 
O φ , while it is in the under-valued   13
regime if the degree of under-valuation exceeds a value of 
U φ .  However 
there is also evidence that the behaviour of policymakers differs according to 
whether or not inflation is close to the inflation target (eg Martin and Milas, 
2004; Srinivasan et al, 2006, Taylor and Davradakis, 2007).  To allow for this, 
we also allow for two inflation regimes, depending on the divergence of 
inflation from the target.  The economy is in the outer inflation regime if 
inflation exceeds the target by more than a value of 
U τ  or if it is below the 
target by more than 
L τ .  Since policymakers choose interest rates before the 
value of inflation, output and exchange rates are known, we can express the 
time-varying parameters in (12) in terms of the probabilities of the economy 
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for  ,, j y e π =  (initial experiments suggested constant parameters on the 
foreign interest rate and lagged interest rate). 
eO
t θ  is the probability that the 
real exchange rate in period t will be in the over-valued ”regime” , 
eU
t θ  is the 
probability it will be in the under-valued regime and  t
π θ  is the probability that 
inflation will not significantly diverge from the target.   14
  This model is sophisticated enough to allow us to address the 
issues we are concerned with.  If  36 0 ee ρ ρ = = , then interest rates do not 
respond to the exchange rate when misalignments are small, as some 
commentators have suggested.  If  1 π ρ  differs from  2 π ρ  and  3 π ρ , and  4 π ρ  
differs from  5 π ρ  and  6 π ρ , then the response to inflation depends on exchange 
rate misalignment, as has been suggested.   Clearly, estimating such a model 
on a relatively limited span of data is challenging.  Fortunately, we were able 
to impose a series of restrictions that simplified estimation greatly.  These 
were (i) interest rates only respond to output in the inner inflation and 
exchange rate regimes (this implies  12456 0 yyyyy ρ ρρρρ = ==== ); (ii) there is 
no response to inflation in the inner inflation regime ( 123 0 πππ ρ ρρ === ); (iii) 
there is no response to the exchange rate in the inner exchange rate regime 
( 36 0 ee ρ ρ == ) and (iv) the response of interest rates to the real exchange rate 
is independent of the rate of inflation ( 12 ee ρ ρ =  and  45 ee ρ ρ = ).  
We make the model operational by assuming  
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Equation (14) models the probability that inflation is no less than 
L τ  
percentage points below the target or no more than 
U τ  percentage points 
above (where we note that these regime boundaries may be asymmetric) 
using a quadratic logistic function, following Jansen and Teräsvirta (1996).   
Equations (15) and (16) model the probability that the economy is in the over-
valued or under-valued exchange rate regimes using logistic functions. These 
functions use  smoothness parameters 
π γ , 
eO γ  and 
eU γ  that determine the 
smoothness of the transition regimes.  We follow Granger and Teräsvirta 
(1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making 
π γ  dimension-free by dividing it by the 
variance of  1 1 t
T
t ππ + + −  and making 
eO γ  and 
eU γ  dimension-free by dividing 
them by the standard deviation of 
*
tt ee − . 
  Estimates of the resulting model are presented in column (i) of Table 2.  
The standard error is substantially lower than for the Taylor rule models 
reported in Table 1, so this approach gives a much better fit to the data.  We 
estimate the regime boundaries to be –0.522 and 0.261 for the inflation 
regime and –5.11 and 4.37 for the exchange rate regimes.  These imply that 
the economy is in the inner inflation regime when inflation is expected to fall 
between  1 t
T π + -0.522 and  1 t
T π + +0.261 percent.  Since the inflation target was 
2.5% from 1997Q2 onwards, the upper boundary of 2.761% to the inner 
inflation regime is closer to the inflation target than the lower boundary of 
1.978%.  This implies a deflationary bias to monetary policy, confirming the   16
findings of Martin and Milas (2004).  The estimated boundaries to the 
exchange rate regimes imply that the economy is in the over-valued (resp. 
under-valued) exchange rate regime when the real exchange rate is over-
valued by more than 5.11% (resp under-valued by more than 4.37%). Both 
inflation and exchange rate boundaries are asymmetric based on the 
statistical tests reported at the bottom of Table 2. 
1   
There is no response of interest rates to the real exchange rate in the 
inner exchange rate regime.  We therefore conclude that policymakers do not 
respond to the real exchange rate when this is over-valued by less than 
5.11% or under-valued by less than 4.37%.  We also find that the response to 
inflation does depend on the exchange rate.  Interest rates do not respond to 
the inflation rate in the inner inflation regime, when inflation is expected to be 
between the  1 t
T π + -0.522 and  1 t
T π + +0.261 percent boundaries (between 
1.978% and 2.761% from 1997Q2 onwards).  In the outer inflation regime, the 
response to inflation is stronger when the exchange rate is in the under-
valued exchange rate regime (i.e.  5 π ρ =3.047) and weaker in the over-valued 
exchange rate regime (i.e.  4 π ρ =1.269).   
                                                           
1 The smoothness parameters 
π γ , 
eO γ  and 
eU γ  reported in Table 2, are imprecisely 
estimated.  Teräsvirta (1994) and van Dijk et al (2002) point out that this should not be 
interpreted as evidence against the model’s validity. Accurate estimation of 
π γ , 
eO γ  and 
eU γ  
is problematic because it requires many observations in the immediate neighbourhood of the 
regime boundaries. Furthermore, large changes in the smoothness parameters have a small 
impact on the shape of the functions (14), (15) and (16), which implies that estimates of 
π γ , 
eO γ  and 
eU γ  do not have to be precise (van Dijk et al, 2002). 
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Column (ii) of Table 2 reports estimates of the same model but where 
the German (Euro) is used in place of the  US interest rate.  These estimates 
lead to similar conclusions.  In this model, policymakers do not respond to the 
real exchange rate when this is over-valued by less than 5.86% or under-
valued by less than 4.96%.   Policymakers do not respond to the inflation rate 
in the inner inflation regime, when inflation is expected to be between  1 t
T π + -
0.66 and  1 t
T π + +0.194 percent (between 1.84% and 2.694% from 1997Q2 
onwards).  The response of interest rates to inflation is again stronger when 
the real exchange rate is under-valued. 
The implications of these estimates for the interpretation of recent UK 
monetary policy are explored in figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3) depicts real 
exchange rate misalignment and the estimated boundaries. Our estimates 
suggest that policymakers raised interest rates in response to under-
valuations of the exchange rate in 1992-1993, 1995-1996 and reduced 
interest rates in response to an over-valuation in 1996-1998, but did not 
respond to the exchange rate at other times.   Policymakers did not respond 
to the exchange rate between 1998-2005 as real exchange rate misalignment 
remained within the regime boundaries.  By contrast, a Taylor rule model 
would imply frequent small interest rate adjustments in this period.  Figure 4) 
depicts the respond of interest rates to inflation implied by the estimates of 
column (i) of table 2), calculated as: 
   18
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To illustrate, although inflation was excessively high in 1995-1996 and in 
1997-1998, the response to inflation was stronger in the first period when the 
exchange was under-valued and weaker in the latter when the exchange rate 
was over-valued.  
 
4)  Conclusions 
This paper has estimated a flexible non-linear monetary policy rule for the UK 
to examine the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate.  Three 
main findings emerge.  First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate 
misalignments rather than to the exchange rate itself.  Second, policymakers 
ignore small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real 
exchange under-valuations of more than 4% and over-valuations of more than 
5%.  Third, the response of policymakers to inflation depends on the 
exchange rate.  The response to inflation is smaller when the exchange rate is 
over-valued and larger when it is under-valued.   
Our work can be extended in several ways. We might estimate our 
model using data for different countries in order to investigate the impact of 
the exchange rate on monetary policy and assess whether the response of 
monetary policy to inflation depends on the exchange rate.  We might also   19
develop a more structural model of the exchange rate and examine its effect 
on the monetary policy rule. We intend to address these issues in future work.   20
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Table 1: Estimates of Augmented Taylor rules (1992Q4 2005Q4) 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii) (iv) 
























i      0.691 (0.041)   0.487 (0.103)   1.044 (0.473)   0.545 (0.273) 
i ρ    0.820 (0.010)   0.844 (0.027)   0.776 (0.315)   0.872 (0.041) 
π ρ    1.762 (0.126)   1.839 (0.538)   1.820 (0.320)   1.713 (0.539) 
y ρ    0.911 (0.140)   1.090 (0.488)   1.311 (0.336)   1.662 (0.872) 
f ρ    0.380 (0.021)   0.311 (0.076)   0.417 (0.047)   0.193 (0.007) 
e ρ  
 
 0.096 (0.007)   0.056 (0.020)   0.168 (0.112) 
 
 0.103 (0.074) 
2
R     0.90     0.88      0.89     0.87 
Standard error    0.320     0.351     0.340     0.371 
Inst. validity     [0.98]    [0.93]    [0.98]    [0.99] 
Normality    [0.61]    [0.67]    [0.73]    [0.91] 
Break-mpc    [0.12]    [0.07]    [0.01]    [0.06] 
Notes:  
(a) Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. Numbers in square 
brackets are the probability values of the test statistics. Inst.validity is the p-value of J 
test of the exogeneity of the instruments, normality is the is the p-value of the  Jarque-
Bera test for normality of the estimate residuals, while break-mpc is the p-value of a 
Chow test for a structural break in 1997Q2 following the formation of the Monetary Policy 
committee.  
(b)  A constant and up to 6 lags of all variables are used as instruments for the estimates.   
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Model with German 
(Euro) interest rate  
regressor 
i     Constant    1.285 (0.054)    0.796 (0.024)
i ρ   Lagged interest rate    0.633 (0.016)    0.717 (0.010)
f ρ   Foreign interest rate    0.411 (0.010)    0.271 (0.020)
Exchange rate Over-valued , inflation close to target  
1 e ρ    Exchange rate   0.075 (0.011)    0.147 (0.017)
Exchange rate Under-valued, inflation close to target 
2 e ρ   Exchange rate    0.075 (0.011)    0.147 (0.017)
Exchange rate close to fundamentals, inflation close to target 
3 y ρ   Output gap    0.896 (0.205)    1.141 (0.433)
Exchange rate Over-valued, inflation not close to target 
4 π ρ    Inflation   1.269 (0.087)    1.569 (0.037)
4 e ρ    Exchange rate   0.027 (0.009)    0.067 (0.007)
Exchange rate Under-valued, inflation not close to target  
5 π ρ    Inflation   3.047 (0.390)    2.167 (0.868)
5 e ρ   Exchange rate    0.027 (0.009)    0.067 (0.007)
Exchange rate close to fundamentals, inflation not close to target 
6 π ρ    Inflation 
 
 1.468 (0.062)    1.233 (0.045)
L τ             -0.522 (0.038)   -0.660 (0.048)
U τ              0.261 (0.071)     0.194 (0.010)
O φ            -5.112 (0.107)    -5.863 (1.874)
U φ            4.368 (0.248)     4.962 (1.001)
π γ        5.525 (19.086)   22.981 (48.105)
eO γ      20.005 (79.543)     89.598 (579.543)
eU γ     10.876 (132.043)    332.755 (330.040)
2
R     0.934    0.900
Standard error    0.262    0.319
Inst. Validity     [0.98]    [0.98]
Normality    [0.14]    [0.63]  25
b) Hypothesis tests 
01 2 : ee H ρ ρ =    Test of common exchange rate 
effects when inflation close to 
target 
  [0.17]    [0.32]
04 5 : ee H ρ ρ =    Test of common exchange rate 
effects when inflation not close to 
target 
  [0.10]    [0.07]
04 5 6 : H π ππ ρ ρρ ==
  Test of common inflation effects    [0.00]    [0.00]
0 :
L U H τ τ =−     Test of symmetric inflation 
bounds. 
  [0.00]    [0.00]
0:
OU H φ φ =−  
  Test of symmetric exchange rate 
bounds. 
  [0.00]     [0.00]
 
 
Notes: See the notes of Table 1.   26
 
Figure 1: Plots of TBR, inflation, output gap, US interest rate and EU 
interest rate 
 













93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
 













93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
 








93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
   27
 















1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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Note: LHS axis: measurement units of the real exchange rate (RER). RHS axis: 
measurement units of the real exchange rate gap (RER gap).     28













Note: The lower bound equals –5.11% and the upper bound equals 4.37%.   29
 























Note: LHS axis: measurement units of the inflation impact (p_impact) calculated as: 
45 6 (1 ){ (1 ) }
eO eU eO eU
tt t t t t
π
ππ π π ρ θθ ρ θ ρ θ θρ =− + +− −   based on the estimates reported in 
column (i) of Table 2. RHS axis: measurement units of the UK Treasury Bill rate (TBR) in %. 
 
 